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Summary
Schumpeter maintained that oscillations of macroeconomic variables are only the
"secondary wave" of business cycles, a reflex of more fundamental "primary
waves" at the microeconomic level caused by the innovative activity of
entrepreneurs. Uniting Schumpeter's concern for innovation with Keynes' concern
for uncertainty and expectations formation, this article focuses on the behaviour of
entrepreneurs confronting uncertainty caused by innovation.
Entrepreneurs' behaviour is reconstructed by modelling the functioning of their
cognitive processes when innovations appear. Recognition of the possibilities
opened up by a successful innovation generates a state of optimism in the minds of
single entrepreneurs, which eventually propagates to the whole economy
triggering an investments upswing. Likewise, unsuccessful innovations can trigger
a downswing.
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1.  Introduction
Joseph A. Schumpeter maintained that business cycles cannot be understood by
looking at macroeconomic variables only, since these are ultimately determined by the
behaviour of entrepreneurs at the microeconomic level. Schumpeter referred to the
investments undertaken by single entrepreneurs as the "primary wave" which, under
favourable circumstances, can propagate throughout the whole economic system,
generating the well-known "secondary wave" at the macroeconomic level (Schumpeter
1939). There is some empirical evidence supporting this view: the large degree of
independence of regional and sectoral economic variables with respect to their
macroeconomic aggregates suggests that macroeconomic fluctuations are a consequence
of microeconomic disturbances, rather than the reverse (Quah 1994).
According to Schumpeter, the driving force of economic development is the
introduction and diffusion of innovations that lower costs and restore profitability.
However, while Schumpeter focused on the behaviour of single entrepreneurs and
postulated the arrival of "innovations swarms" in order to explain cycles (Schumpeter
1911), modern Schumpeterians stress rather the role of diffusion processes in
transforming disordered innovative activity at the microeconomic level into a coherent
macroeconomic wave (Silverberg and Lehnert 1993, 1994).
This article investigates a particular aspect of the process of innovation adoption,
namely the recognition of the worth of an innovation and the decision to invest on it. It
focuses on the moment where an entrepreneur realises that an innovation is opening up
new fields of activity while, at the same time, closing old ones. On these occasions, the
emergence of an innovation affects the confidence that entrepreneurs attach to their
actions, triggering bursts of optimism and pessimism that are essential to explain real
investments. Rather than rational decision-making, this mode of behaviour reminds of
Keynes's "animal spirits" (Keynes 1936, 1937a, 1937b).
This article moves from the conviction that "animal spirits" can only be
understood and rationalised if interpreted in cognitive terms, i.e. as deriving from the3
inadequacy of existing mental categories to capture novelties when they appear.
Individuals are likely not to be able to understand the value and the drawbacks of
something they have never seen before. They are prone to sudden changes of the
confidence they attach to their expectations.
Confidence changes when a mental model does not work anymore, because the
mental categories it is based upon must be re-formulated in order to enlarge (or restrict)
the possibilities that an individual is able to conceive. Thus, by modelling mental models
it is possible to formalise the arousal of confidence states.
The model of confidence oscillation expounded in this article applies an
algorithm for complexity evaluation that is based on cognition of a system's behaviour
(Fioretti 1998, 1999). However, acquaintance with the general model is not required in
this self-contained, simplified case.
Section 2 explains the way a decision to invest on a novel field is linked to a
change of mental models. Section 3 highlights an empirical feature of investing
behaviour that lends itself to be modelled by a simple mental model. Section 4 entails the
mathematical description of this mental model, defines a degree of confidence and
utilises self-organisation principles to link "primary" and "secondary" waves in
investment cycles. Section 5 presents simulations of investment cycles that illustrate the
kind of decision-making this model can explicate. Finally, section 6 concludes with an
assessment of the potentialities and the limitations of the model exposed herein.
2.  Investments and Mental Models
In general, formal investment models provided by the economic literature are not
concerned with recognising the value of an innovation and convincing oneself that
success will accrue to him who will devote his resources to make it marketable. On this4
particular field, Schumpeter’s and Keynes’s intuitions did not receive any formalisation
hitherto. Investment models work at a less detailed level, where psychological
considerations have already been lumped into economic magnitudes.
This is true for the investments acceleration principle, which is based on the
observation that decision-makers are likely to react to variations of demand rather than
its level (Clark 1917), as well as for Tobin’s q, which is based on market evaluation of a
firm’s perspectives (Tobin 1969). Less obviously, this is equally true for option-pricing
investment models as well, where irreversibility makes investments depend on
uncertainty of the relevant variables (Dixit and Pindyck 1994).
According to Dixit-Pindyck’s model, a series of fairly realistic assumptions such
as irreversibility of investment, imperfect competition and decreasing returns to scale at
firm’s level establishes a negative relationship between investments and the variance of
returns on investments (Caballero 1991). While perfectly compatible with Schumpeter’s
and Keynes’s insights, my question is: How do decision-makers evaluate the statistical
properties of costs and revenues?
Dixit-Pindyck’s model prompted a number of empirical investigations that
highlighted a negative influence of uncertainty on investments, where uncertainty is
measured by the variance of macroeconomic variables, both real and monetary (Driver
and Moreton 1991; George and Morisset 1995; Price 1995; Caballero and Pindyck 1996;
Goel and Ram 1999; Guiso and Parigi 1999; Calcagnini and Saltari 2000; Ghosal and
Loungani 2000), the variance of macroeconomic forecasts (Ferderer 1993), the variance
of indicators of political instability (Alesina and Perotti 1996; Svensson 1998; Lehmann
1999) or the variance of indicators of corruption (Wei 1997). But apart from all these ex
post confirmations of the existence of an inverse relationship between uncertainty and
investments, one can reasonably ask how managers actually carry out ex ante evaluations
of prospective investments.
Dixit-Pindyck’s model derives from option-pricing theory in financial markets.
As such, it requires complete markets for a set of given goods that exist long enough to
enable statistical calculations. Unsurprisingly, the only empirical application of Dixit-5
Pindyck model at a very detailed level (Harchaoui and Lasserre 2001) regards copper
mining, a sector where product innovation does not exist and process innovation is
embedded in machineries that are produced by other industries.
Although it is formally possible to think managers as calculating the variance of
subjective probability distributions over the acceptance of a novel product, this should be
viewed as a scheme for ex post description rather than a procedure for ex ante evaluation
of decision-making. If we want to capture Schumpeter’s and Keynes’s insights on
decision-making, we must model managerial psychology, vision and modes of
deliberation (Lane, Malerba, Maxfield and Orsenigo 1996; Witt 1998). In order to do
that, it is necessary to get acquainted with a few basic concepts regarding cognition.
Firstly, the concept of a mental category. Individuals simplify the mess of
information they receive by classifying it into a manageable number of mental
categories, a sort of containers whereby they highlight differences between information
that is classified in different categories and blur differences within categories.
Classification of information into mental categories is, clearly, an instance of bounded
rationality (Simon 1982), but it is not an instance of algorithmic computation. In fact,
neither the number of mental categories, nor the criteria by which information is
classified are given once and for all. Furthermore, the same individual may use different
mental categories in different situations, categories may not be constructed around a
single prototype and, in general, mental categories may have fuzzy boundaries (Barsalou
1987; Lakoff 1987; Hampton 1993; Clark 1993).
Secondly, the concept of a mental model. A mental model is a sort of map that
provides orientation in decision-making by telling an individual at any time what it is
'normal' for him to expect; it is, in other words, a set of causal relationships that link a set
of possible causes with a set of possible effects (Johnson-Laird 1983). At a more detailed
level, and consistently with a line of thought that places intelligence in the structure of
information flows within a distributed system (Hebb 1949; Hayek 1952), a mental model
can be seen as a net of connections that link mental categories to one another.6
In any case, mental categories and mental models should not be viewed as
evolving independently of one another. Rather, mental categories are constructed in
order to fit into a particular mental model, and a mental model is arranged with the
purpose of simplifying causal links between mental categories.
One possibility for eliciting managers’ mental constructs is that of carrying out a
linguistic analysis of corporate documents, such as annual reports to shareholders
(Sigismund Huff 1990; Sigismund Huff, Narapareddy and Fletcher 1990). Figure A
illustrates the mental model of Admiral, a TV sets maker, derived by means of this
technique out of documents spanning the period 1960-63 (Narayanan and Fahey 1990).
FIGURE A
The mental model of Admiral’s managers in the years 1960-63, elicited by Narayanan and Fahey (1990)
out of corporate documents. © John Wiley and Sons 19907
According to figure A, in the early 1960s Admiral’s managers classified
information in categories regarding functional strategy (Manufacturing,  Marketing,
Product Development,  Finance and Organization), industry conditions (Growth,
Competitors,  Suppliers,  Customers,  Distribution and Imports), macroeconomic
environment (Economy, Political, Strikes) and objectives (Product Features, Cost, Sales
and  Profit). In figure A, these categories are linked by arrows that represent the
managers’ view of causal relationships between them. Strategic action followed
accordingly.
Obviously, mental models change with time. New categories are formed, old
categories are dismissed, and causal links are rearranged. Figure B illustrates the
evolution of Admiral’s managers’ mental models from 1960-63 to 1964-66, 1967-70 and
1971-73 (Narayanan and Fahey 1990). In 1974, Admiral dismissed TV sets production.8
FIGURE B
The sequence of mental models of Admiral’s managers in the years 1960-63, 1964-66, 1967-70 and 1971-
73, elicited by Narayanan and Fahey (1990). This sequence should be read from left to right, from top to
bottom. In order to ease comparison, all mental categories envisaged by the management between 1960
and 1973 have been drawn. In order to simplify the picture, details concerning the purpose of single
categories have been erased. © John Wiley and Sons 1990
Changes of the mental model correspond to fundamental environmental and
strategic changes in the history of Admiral, such as Japanese penetration of U.S. market,
construction of a facility for colour tubes production, or early switch to solid-state
technology. Mental models do not change very often, but when they do, that happens
because important novelties appear.9
Not all investments imply the adoption of innovations, but those envisaged by
Schumpeter and Keynes do. Thus, a decision to invest reflects a change of the underlying
mental model. This is the basic consideration underlying the decision-making model
presented henceforth.
Since this article does not want to focus on a specific case-study but rather to
elicit general features of investment decision-making, a much simpler mental model will
be employed than those illustrated in figures A and B. The ensuing Section 3 provides a
rationale for the mental model that will be expounded in Section 4.
3.  Animal Spirits
Most economists regard animal spirits as a whimsical idea, but most economists
finish their papers later than they expected. Moreover, they persist to expect finishing
their papers earlier than they will actually do, even if that already happened a number of
times. Most importantly, this “irrational” behaviour is good for their profession, since if
they would correctly estimate the time they need in order to finish a paper, they probably
would not embark in the enterprise of writing it (Kahneman and Lovallo 1994).
Overconfidence is a widespread attitude of human behaviour, one that was
selected through millennia of evolution because it is good for society that some
individuals explore novel possibilities. Overconfidence means that when a decision
setting has novel features, humans evaluate that situation as unique rather than stressing
similarities with past experiences and drawing statistical inferences from them.
Consider an individual who is starting a business. Statistically, enterprises that
are similar to the one that he has in mind may have, say, a 50% chance of success. But
this chance was computed by ignoring the specificities of his particular enterprise, and it
is exactly these specificities that make the difference between failure and success. This is10
absolutely true, even if decision-makers may not evaluate correctly the specificities of
their enterprises so in the end they collectively build up a mere 50% probability of
success.
Overconfidence is a widespread phenomenon that has been highlighted by a
number of laboratory experiments. Moreover, group experiments showed that
organisations are not less prone to overconfidence than single individuals are (Dosi and
Lovallo 1997; Camerer and Lovallo 1999). Possibly, it is the reason for stock markets
prices to be distributed according to power laws with fat tails, independently of herding
effects (Gopikrishnan, Plerou, Gabaix and Stanley 2000; Gopikrishnan, Plerou, Gabaix,
Amaral and Stanley 2001).
Overconfidence arises when decision-makers firmly believe a mental model that
promises a rosy future for them and their organisation. But sometimes empirical
experience discomfirms rosy mental models, e.g. during the series of events that led
Admiral to withdraw from the television industry. Risk aversion then takes the place of
bold activism, narrow mental models and timid choices result. Oscillation between these
two extremes is a widespread feature of human behaviour, a common finding of a long
series of experiments (Kahneman and Lovallo 1994).
These are the stylised facts upon which we will build a simple model of investing
behaviour. They are coherent with Keynesian and psychoanalytical insights (Winslow
1986), and they are supported by empirical data showing that investments, even at plant
level, are actually a series of spikes (Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger 1995; Doms and
Dunne 1998; Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power 1999).
Ryall (1996) models switching between alternative hypotheses by inserting or
deleting a causal link in what we called a mental model. We shall adopt a similar
representation, where investing will depend on empirical experience suggesting or
discomfirming certain causal links.11
4.  A Model Mental Model
Let us describe entrepreneurs' cognition by means of two classes of mental
categories: one for the actions they undertake in order to produce and sell goods (usually
entailing an act of spending), the other for the results they obtain from customers
(generally associated with proceeds). The situation faced by an entrepreneur is a set of
pairs action-result that occurred recently, while his behaviour is the particular action he
is undertaking.
The actions entrepreneurs undertake, as well as the results they obtain, involve
innovation of the qualitative features of goods, tastes and technologies. However,
although the qualitative features of their actions and results will change with time in
unpredictable ways, we shall assume that entrepreneurs classify them in the following
given set of mental categories:
A−: The category of all entrepreneurial actions that require little money outlays, involve
little innovation, but also little risk. Actions of this kind are not likely to lead to
great production and profit expansion, but they are undertaken if the desire for
safety is strong enough. Performing an action of category A− denotes a high
preference for liquidity.
A+: The category of actions that, on the contrary, need large money outlays and involve
important innovations, although they inevitably bear larger risks. Nevertheless,
actions of this kind can be undertaken if one expects from them a much better result
than from any action of category A−. In other words, actions of category A+ are
investments in the most genuine sense of this term.
R−: The category of mediocre results one normally expects from actions of category
A−. On the contrary, obtaining a result of category R− from an action of category
A+ can be a disaster if a large money outlay was involved.12
R+: The category of good results entrepreneurs expect from actions of category A+. Of
course, it may happen that a result of category R+ is obtained from an action of
category A−: this is an unlikely, but a particularly favourable happening.
With some simplification, actions of category A+ can be called investment decisions
while actions of category A− can be called stand-by decisions.
Decision-makers recognise innovations by the fact that old mental models do not
work anymore. For instance, a new technology may make typing machines obsolete and
disclose new possibilities for computers. Then, a mental model entailing causal
relationships like "If I produce typing machines I will make good profits" and "If I
produce computers nobody will buy them, because they are too big", may no longer be a
reliable guide to decision-making.
Let us assume that the mental model of entrepreneurs is constituted by one-to-one
connections between action categories and result categories as shown in figure C: once
an action of category A− is undertaken a result of category R− is considered to be the
normal outcome. Likewise, and once an action of category A+ is undertaken a result of
category R+ is considered to be normal. In other terms, the mental model of figure C
says that good revenues are the normal outcome of investing and that mediocre revenues



























Top left (a), the mental model of entrepreneurs. Top right (b), a new causal link arises when innovation
opens up new investment possibilities. Bottom left (c), a new causal link arises when innovation makes
investments unprofitable, that used to be safe. Bottom right (d), both of these new causal links occur at a
time.
When correspondences other than those of case (a) occur, our entrepreneur may
think that the categories and the model he is using are no longer appropriate to detect the
relevant features of a reality where novelties are emerging. For instance, a new
technology may open new profit possibilities, a circumstance that would show up as the
connections of case (b). But it may also cause the unexpected failure of investments on a
field that used to be safe, in which case connections are as in (c). It may also produce
both effects at the same time, as it is shown in (d).
If the relations between mental categories are either as in (b), or (c), or (d), our
entrepreneur is likely to think that this is the signal that an innovation is emerging, one
that might have profound consequences for his investments. Independently of the
probability distribution of successes and failures that he might have computed in the
past, misfunctioning of his mental model is likely to change the confidence he attaches to
its prescriptions. Whether optimism as in (b), pessimism as in (c), or confusion as in (d),
misfunctioning of his mental model inevitably alters his "animal spirits".
However, it is important to remark that a mental model says what is 'normal' to
happen, not what must invariably happen all the times. Consequently, it is by no means14
obvious that correspondences like those illustrated in (b), (c), (d) should be interpreted as
failures of the mental model. They could be interpreted equally well as situations that
occur rarely, though sometimes do. Even without innovations, there is a positive
probability that "safe" investments fail.
The trouble is that the emergence of novel profit possibilities shows up exactly in
the same way as low-probability events do: it is up to the entrepreneur to decide whether
what he is observing is the signal that the world is changing, or to discard it as worthless
information. In other words, it is up to any single entrepreneur to detect the new profit
possibilities opened up by an innovation, or to miss them. And from an entrepreneur's
point of view, this is no little difference.
However, from the modeller's point of view it is very easy to overcome this
difficulty. In fact, it is sensible to assume that entrepreneurs use only the most recent
information in order to evaluate the appropriateness of their mental models, while they
use all information at their disposal in order to evaluate probability distributions of
successes and failures. Only the most recent data can regard emerging innovations; on
the contrary, it makes sense to use new and old information alike in order to calculate a
probability distribution that is useful precisely to the extent that the present situation is
similar to the past ones.
Thus, let us assume that entrepreneurs are endowed with a memory of length L,
and that they use all of its data to calculate a probability distribution of their successes
and failures. On the contrary, their confidence in this probability distribution derives
from the most recent data only, say the ones in the first  ML <<   memory locations.
The first M memory locations must be scrutinised in order to detect any deviance
from the mental model illustrated in figure C, case (a). If connections occurred, that are
not those of the mental model, then the decision-maker does not have absolute
confidence in the probability distributions that he calculates using data from all L
memory locations.
Note that, unlike probability, it does not matter how many times one of these
connections occurred, but only whether it occurred or not. Think of an entrepreneur who15
realises that some new technology allows high profits with relatively little effort, a
circumstance which shows up as a set of connections like those of figure C, case (b): it
does not matter whether he receives one or two news about this novel possibility, the
crucial issue is realising that such a novel profit possibility exists.
Let us represent the relationships entailed in the first M memory locations by
means of a simplicial complex K K K K  made by two simplices A− and A+ having R− and
R+ as vertices. In case (a), simplex A− is constituted by the single point R− while
simplex A+ is constituted by the single point R+:  the two simplices have no point in
common and no simplicial complex exists, since A− and A+ are not connected. In case
(b) simplex A+ is still constituted by the single point R+, but simplex A− is the
segment uniting R− and R+:  the two simplices have vertex R+ in common, simplicial
complex K K K K  is made of a segment and one of its extreme points. Case (c) is similar to
(b), just exchange R− and R+. In case (d) both A− and A+ are segments between R−
and R+: the two simplices have one edge in common and simplicial complex K K K K  is
made by two overlapping segments.
Let us stipulate that the complexity of isolated simplices is zero, while the










                                                  (1)
where  q is connection level, defined as the dimension of common faces between
simplices, sq is the number of disjoint classes of simplices that are connected at level q,
and Q is the largest value attained by q in K K K K.
In the four cases illustrated in figure C, application of equation (1) yields
ca K K K K a f = 0,  cc bc K K K KK K K K a f a f == 1  and  cd K K K K a f = 2,  respectively. Furthermore, if we
stipulate that simplices A− and A+ contribute to complexity according to their
dimensions (Fioretti 1998), we obtain  cc aa AA − + == bg bg 0;  cb A− = bg 1,  cb A+ = bg 0;
cc A− = bg 0,  cc A+ = bg 1;  cc dd AA − + == bg bg 1.16
If complexity measures how "complex" a situation appears to the decision-maker,
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where  A A A ∈ −+ , lq .
This degree of confidence takes values in the  01 ,  interval. In our case, these
values are:  χ χ aa AA − + == bg bg 1;  χ b A− = bg 0,  χ b A+ = bg 1;  χ c A− = bg 1,
χ c A+ = bg 0;  χ χ dd AA − + == bg bg 12.
At this point, we can suppose that our entrepreneurs behave as follows:
  If empirical experience confirms their mental models, illustrated in case (a) of figure
C, then they calculate probabilities  p RA bg   over the whole length L of their
memories and they undertake actions of category A− or A+ according to the rule of
expected profit maximisation.
  If empirical experience highlighted innovations that opened up new profit
possibilities, i.e. if they view a situation like in case (b) of figure C, then they
undertake actions of category A+.
  If empirical experience highlighted innovations that are likely to force firms to
abandon established fields of activity, i.e. if they view a situation like in case (c) of
figure C, then they undertake actions of category A−.
  If empirical experience is ambiguous as in case (d) of figure C, they decide not to
make any decision, wait for better information and, in the meantime, keep doing the
kind of action that they used to do.
These assumptions translate into saying that, if a decision has to be taken, then
entrepreneurs maximise objective function:
Jp P p P C A: A R A R R A R A af afch bg di bg af =+ − −−++ χ             (3)17
where  A A A ∈ − + , lq . In equation (3), C A- bg  and C A+ bg  denote the costs associated
with action categories A− and A+, respectively; P R- bg  and P R+ bg  denote the proceeds
associated with result categories R− and R+, respectively; p RA bg  express the
conditional probabilities of obtaining a result of category R after pursuing an action of
category A. It is, obviously, C A af ≥ 0 and P R af ≥ 0.
Within square brackets, equation (3) includes expected profits π A af . Expected
profits are decisive when  χ χ aa AA − + == bg bg 1,  i.e. in case (a) of figure C.
On the contrary, in case (b) or (c), where χ b A− = bg 0 and χ b A+ = bg 1 or
χ c A− = bg 1 and χ c A+ = bg 0, the degree of confidence determines which category of
action will be undertaken. Since degrees of confidence may vary abruptly as a
consequence of the latest  AR , af  pair, innovations produce sudden jumps of the degrees
of confidence and sharp changes in the behaviour of entrepreneurs. The ensuing
"primary" investments waves may then propagate to the whole system and eventually
generate a "secondary wave" at the macro level.
Finally, in case (d) no change of the course of action is undertaken, so equation
(3) is not used at all. In a more general modellisation of cognitive processes, case (d)
would trigger a reformulation of the mental model as well as of the underlying mental
categories.
5.  A Toy Economy
Let us now apply the above ideas to a model of investment cycles that has no
pretension of realism, but which is able to highlight the interplay of "primary" and
"secondary" waves. Continuous introduction of innovations is supposed to keep the
economy away from both perfect competition and monopoly, in the difficult realm of
imperfect competition.18
Let us consider a population of entrepreneurs that interact with one another, as
well as with a population of consumers. No other economic agents exist. Although
entrepreneurs hire workers in order to constitute firms, since decision-making will be
ascribed to single entrepreneurs we shall always speak of "entrepreneurs", never of
"firms".
In order to allow each entrepreneur to trade with any other entrepreneur as well as
with any consumer, let us assume that: i) All goods can be either consumed or used as
production factors; ii) Any one good can be exchanged with any other one; iii) All
entrepreneurs know which actions other entrepreneurs have undertaken and which results
they obtained.
In order to avoid any constraint of past decisions on current production
possibilities, let us also assume that: iv) No capital goods exist; v) No inventories exist;
vi) Labour contracts refer to one production period only.
Entrepreneurs undertake actions towards other entrepreneurs as well as towards
final consumers, receiving corresponding results from both kinds of agents. On the
contrary, consumers are supposed to behave in a more passive way: they return results to
entrepreneurs but they do not undertake actions of their own. The actions that
entrepreneurs undertake consist of organising the production and sale of goods that
generally entail some novel qualitative features, require new tastes to be appreciated and
new technologies to be produced. The results that entrepreneurs receive concern the
reception of these goods by the market.
The categories by which actions and results are classified are A−, A+, R−, R+.
These categories mainly capture product innovation. In fact, due to absence of capital
goods, they do not record technological innovation except in the very limited sense of
learning by doing of pure labour. Tastes innovation is also minimal, since consumers
accept the innovations proposed by entrepreneurs but do not carry out innovations on
their own.
Let N be the number of entrepreneurs. Let us arrange the experiences made by
entrepreneurs in a matrix E that represents their short-term memory, the one they use in19
order to evaluate confidence in their mental models. Matrix E has M rows and N
columns, where element emn represents the pair  AR , a f obtained by the n-th entrepreneur
m time steps ago. Whenever an entrepreneur undertakes an action and receives a result,
the corresponding column of matrix E is scaled down by one position (the oldest
experience is forgotten) and the new  A R , a f pair enters the first row of E (the new
experience is learned). Assuming perfect information, let us stipulate that matrix E is
accessible to all entrepreneurs.
Let  x ∈ 01 ,  denote the proportion of entrepreneurs who undertake an action of
category A+. It is x = 0 if all entrepreneurs undertake actions of category A− and it is
x =1 if all entrepreneurs undertake actions of category A+.
As long as at x = 0 (x =1) all returned results belong to category R− (R+),
entrepreneurs' mental models are confirmed. In fact, they either observe  A R −− , bg  or
AR ++ , bg , all the times. In this sense, x = 0 and x =1 are equilibrium points.
However, even at equilibrium entrepreneurs innovate. In fact, at x = 0 they
innovate because they hope to get a result of category R+, while at x =1 they innovate
because they fear that their competitors' innovations may turn their result into one of
category  R−. Innovations can be unexpectedly successful, which is the case when at
x = 0 a result of category R+ obtains. Or they can be unexpectedly unsuccessful, which
is the case when at x =1 a result of category R− obtains.
Thus, even when the economy is at equilibrium, either at x = 0 or at x =1, an
unexpected result may suddenly change the degree of confidence and eventually push the
system towards the other equilibrium. This mechanism can easily produce an irregular
cycle where the economy continuously jumps from one equilibrium to the other.
The economy described above is a system composed by a large number of
interacting particles which generate a coherent macroscopic behaviour, a situation that is
known in physics as self-organisation (Nicolis and Prigogine 1977). Self-organisation
occurs when some state variables are unstable and much slower than the stable ones.
While the fast and stable variables drive the system towards the equilibrium of the basin
of attraction it is in, the slow and unstable variables (also called order parameters) push20
the system out of its basin of attraction and towards another basin of attraction and
another equilibrium state (Haken 1983, 1987).
The order parameters of our system are χ A− bg  and χ A+ bg . They are unstable,
since they may suddenly take on a different value, they are slow in the sense that they
stay at a value long enough for the fast and stable variable x to move onto another
equilibrium, and they are responsible for the economy to jump in and out of its two
equilibria.
The model needs parameters that specify the behaviour of entrepreneurs. Let
these parameters be:  p RA ; A + −− − = di ε ,  p RA ; A − ++ + = ch ε ,  p RA ; A ++−− = di ϕ
and  p RA ; A −−++ = ch ϕ ,  where e.g. ε− is the probability that an entrepreneur who is
willing to undertake an action of category A− returns a result of category R+ to
somebody who undertakes an action of category A− towards him. It is, obviously,
01 ≤≤ − + − + εεϕ ϕ ,,, .
Let us assume that, with N entrepreneurs, there are N −1 consumers. In this way,
for any entrepreneur it is equally likely to meet a consumer or another entrepreneur.
By assuming that L is sufficiently large for entrepreneurs to correctly estimate
probabilities p RA bg , these can be expressed as follows:
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The terms in square brackets represent the outcome of encounters between
entrepreneurs. On the contrary, the rightmost terms of equations ( a d) 4 ÷  represent the21
outcome of encounters between consumers and entrepreneurs. These terms have been
supposed to depend on the actions undertaken by entrepreneurs, through the channel of
wages. In this way, the Keynesian multiplier enters the model.
Equations (a d ) 4 ÷  allow to express objective function J A b g as a function of x.
In their turn, entrepreneurs undertake an action of category A− (A+) if J A− bg  (J A+ bg )
is greater than J A+ bg  (J A− bg ). In this way the model is closed, and simulations can be
carried out.
At each time interval a randomly chosen entrepreneur undertakes an action
towards an agent who may either be a consumer or another entrepreneur, and receives a
result from him. The  AR bg  pair obtained in this way enters matrix E and may
eventually produce a sudden jump of the degree of confidence. At the same time, the
action undertaken by the entrepreneur causes a smooth change of x and, through
(a d ) 4 ÷ , a corresponding change of probabilities p RA bg . In this way, at the beginning
of the next time interval J A− bg  and J A+ bg  will take new values. For greater clarity,
figure D displays a flow chart of the steps involved.22
FIGURE D
Flow scheme of the simulations. Confidence can either change because a pair (A, R) is forgotten (it exits
E), or because it is experienced (it enters E). In both cases, the programme evaluates whether confidence is
in state (a), (b), (c) or (d). If it is in state (d), it loops until enough confusing (A, R) pairs are forgotten.
Otherwise, an entrepreneur undertakes an action, x changes and conditional probabilities are updated. The
new (A, R) pair eventually causes confidence to change again and a new cycle begins.
This model requires the following set of exogenous parameters in order to run: M
(the memory length), N (the number of entrepreneurs), C A- bg ,  C A+ bg ,  P R- bg  and
P R+ bg  (the costs and proceeds associated with action categories and result categories,
respectively),  ε−,  ε+,  ϕ− and ϕ+ (the probabilities for entrepreneurs who are
determined to undertake actions of a certain category to return particular results to23
actions undertaken by others). Although ten parameters are admittedly many, most of
them are bound to one another by the following requirements:
I.  Memory must be short in order to allow interesting dynamics of confidence
change, definitely shorter than the number of agents (which are N entrepreneurs
plus N −1 consumers). Thus, it must be  MN << − 21 .
II.  Since at each time step only one entrepreneur acts, a large N would slow down the
diffusion of modes of action to the point that confidence change would occur
before the economy approaches either  x = 0  or  x =1.  Thus, in order to have
interesting dynamics it must be  N not >> 0.
III.  Actions of category A+, although more costly, must be more attractive than
actions of category A−. Thus, it must be  CC AA - bgbg < + ,  PP RR - bgbg < + ,  and
PC PC RARA ++−− −>− bgbgbgbg .
IV.  The possibility of obtaining a result of category R− after having invested in an
action of category A+, must be a terrific one. Conversely, the possibility of
obtaining a result of category R+ after having committed to an action of category
A−, must be an exciting one. Thus, let us require that
PC PC RA RA - bgbg bgbg −< <− + −−   and  PC PC RA RA + − ++ −> >− bgbg bgbg .
V.  It is very unlikely that case (b) of figure C occurs when one meets an entrepreneur
who is determined to undertake an action of category A−. Similarly, it is very
unlikely that case (c) of figure C occurs when one meets an entrepreneur who is
determined to undertake an action of category A+. Thus, it is safe to assume that
ε− <<1  and  ε+ <<1.
VI.  Entrepreneurs who undertake actions of category A+ tend to give results of
category R+ more often than entrepreneurs who undertake actions of category A−
do. Thus, we require that  ϕ− ≤ 05 .   and  ϕ+ ≤ 05 ..
VII.  However, the probability of returning a result of category R− (R+) to an action of
category A− (A+) must be larger than the probability of returning a result of
category R− (R+) to an action of category A+ (A−). Thus, it must be  ϕ ε −− >
and  ϕ ε ++ > .24
Let us begin with a suitable set of parameters that satisfies constraints (I VII ÷ ).
A possible choice is:  M = 2;  N = 5;  C A- bg =100;  C A+ = bg 1000 ,;   P R- bg =101;
P R+ = bg 1100 ,;   εε − + == 01 .;   ϕ ϕ − + == 0.4. Initial values can be set at  x0 12 = ,
χ 0 12 A− = bg ,  χ 0 12 A+ = bg .
Figure E depicts x during the first 500 steps of a typical simulation. Figures F and
G illustrate the corresponding oscillations of χ A− bg  and χ A+ bg , respectively.
FIGURE E
The trend of x, which is the proportion of entrepreneurs who are undertaking actions of category A+. All
parameters at their base values.
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FIGURE F
The trend of χ A− bg  (thick line) versus the trend of x (thin line). All parameters at their base values.
FIGURE G
The trend of χ A+ bg  (thick line) versus the trend of x (thin line). All parameters at their base values.
By observing figures F and G it is evident that sudden changes of χ A− bg  and/or
χ A+ bg  generally trigger variations of x, but also that this is not always the case. Degrees
of confidence change as a consequence of microeconomic events, the "primary wave"
that eventually propagates to the whole economy showing up in x as a "secondary wave".
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Thus, macroeconomic behaviour stems from microeconomic interactions that
occasionally trigger investment avalanches. Eventually, but not always, these avalanches
may spread over the whole system.
Figures F and G also highlight that, at a few rare times, a change of confidence is
favoured by macroeconomic conditions. This can be observed, for instance, around the
300-th step of figure G, where a high confidence in actions of category A+ fails to
establish a durable high level of x, which in its turn favours confidence to go down
again.
Finally, periods of constant x at 01 << x  generally correspond to both χ A− bg  and
χ A+ bg  at 0.5. During these periods, contradictory experiences disconfirm entrepreneurs’
mental models as in case (d) of figure C, so they do not dare of changing the action that
they are undertaking.
It is important to realise that this model is similar in kind to deterministic chaos
models. In fact, a small randomness introduced by random pairing of agents and random
endowment of agents with probabilities ε−,  ε+,  ϕ−,  ϕ+ is amplified until a large
macroscopic effect is produced. In order to illustrate how different the outcomes of this
model can be, figure H reports ten runs that have been obtained using the same
parameters that generated figure E (reproduced within figure H as the first graph top
left).27
FIGURE H
Ten time series of x generated with all parameters at the same values as in figure E. The graph of figure E
is here reproduced top left. Little similarity can be discerned between these ten pictures.
However, individual time series may be very different from one another and yet
share some common statistical features over long periods. Figure I illustrates the
outcome of a simulation that is similar in any respect to those of figures E and H, except
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FIGURE I
A time series of x, 5,000 steps. All parameters at the same values as in figures E and H.
Intuitively, the graph of figure I appears more akin to the typical volatility of
empirical investment time series. This impression stems from the fact that a large
number of observations highlights statistical regularities.
Thus, evaluation of the model’s sensitivity to parameters should be made with
respect to indicators that are computed over very long time series. To this aim, for each
set of parameters 500-steps simulations have been repeated 10,000 times, yielding a total
of 5,000,000 time steps. Furthermore, in order to measure the extent of variation over
two such long runs, two of them have been carried out with all parameters at base values.
The following indicators have been chosen in order to characterise the outcome of
the model: 1) The number of times x is at level zero; 2) The number of times x is at level
one; 3) The number of times a variation of x occurs. These indicators have been denoted
by z, o and v, respectively.
Parameters have been varied as follows. M, the memory length whose base value
is  M = 2, has been tested at M =1 and M = 3. N, the number of entrepreneurs whose
base value is N = 5, has been tested at N = 4 and N = 6. Costs and proceeds have been
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sampled by defining proceeds in terms of rates of return to the corresponding costs ρ−
and  ρ+, by multiplying costs by a coefficient σ, and by exploring variations of
ρ ρ ρ = + − and σ. Since base values of costs and proceeds implied ρ =10 and σ =1,
with  ρ−=1% and ρ+=10%, tests have been made with ρ = 5,  ρ = 20 ( ρ+= 5%,
ρ+= 20% with ρ−=1%), σ = 01 .  and σ =10. Finally, probabilities ε−, ε+, ϕ−, ϕ+ are
constrained by (V VII ÷ ) not to move a lot away from their base values εε − + == 01 .
and ϕ ϕ − + == 0.4, so simulations with εε − + == 0, εε − + == 02 .,   ϕ ϕ − + == 03 . a n d
ϕ ϕ − + == 05 .  have been carried out.
Table 1 illustrates the values attained by z, o, v averaged over 10,000 repetitions
of 500-steps simulations. Two evaluations with base parameter values have been carried
out in order to measure the extent of random variations.
Table 1
zov
Base Values  (B.V.) 165.86 71.05 75.21
Base Values  (B.V.) 164.92 71.28 75.38
M = 1  (B.V. 2) 284.05 57.64 112.34
M = 3  (B.V. 2) 88.18 49.65 39.37
N = 4  (B.V. 5) 229.28 79.18 85.73
N = 6  (B.V. 5) 121.97 58.17 59.29
σ = 0.1  (B.V. 1) 164.50 71.65 75.30
σ = 10  (B.V. 1) 164.39 71.45 75.51
ρ = 5  (B.V. 10) 165.78 71.67 75.89
ρ = 20  (B.V. 10) 165.56 70.92 75.16
ε- = ε+ = 0  (B.V. 0.1) 485.01 5.43 4.92
ε- = ε+ = 0.2  (B.V. 0.1) 84.67 55.51 73.97
ϕ- = ϕ+ = 0.3  (B.V. 0.4) 153.22 68.12 69.69
ϕ- = ϕ+ = 0.5  (B.V. 0.4) 174.11 74.17 80.7730
Table 1 highlights that the outcomes of this model are strongly dependent on
memory length and, to a lesser extent, on the number of entrepreneurs. In accordance
with requirement (II), the number of entrepreneurs had to be kept quite low in order to
avoid that confidence changes before the economy ever reaches x = 0 or x =1.
Consequently, following requirement (I) M had to be kept low as well. Higher values of
M and N would be possible if several entrepreneurs would be allowed to act at each time
step.
On the contrary, costs and proceeds appear to have very little impact on the
model. This is hardly surprising, because only when case (a) of figure C occurs do these
entrepreneurs evaluate expected profits. However, one may want to investigate whether
there exist values where costs and rates of return influence the outcome of the model.
Table 2 makes clear that the lowest values of σ and ρ where this occurs are either
contradictory with requirement (IV), or clearly unrealistic.
Table 2
zo v
Base Values  (B.V.) 165.86 71.05 75.21
Base Values  (B.V.) 164.92 71.28 75.38
σ = 10
11  (B.V. 1) 65.71 169.55 75.32
ρ = 1000  (B.V. 10) 65.18 170.89 75.37
Finally, probabilities ε−, ε+, ϕ−, ϕ+, have a sizeable impact on the model. Note
that, since it does not matter how many times cross-connections like those of cases (b)
and (c) of figure C occurred, but only whether they did occur or not, the effect of a
variation of small probabilities like ε−, ε+ is much greater than the effect of a variation
of large probabilities like ϕ−, ϕ+.31
6.  Conclusions
The model presented in this article combines Keynes' insights on "animal spirits"
with Schumpeter's concern with innovation. It does not claim that this is what either
Keynes or Schumpeter had in mind, but it shows that this cultural operation is possible,
and that it yields interesting results.
Modellisation of entrepreneurs' cognitive processes is by far the most original and
innovative content of this model. While it cannot claim to exhaust the range of meanings
that Keynes attached to the expression "animal spirits", it discloses a possibly fruitful
path towards the quantification of non-probabilistic, cognitive uncertainty. Note also that
the proposed "degree of confidence" does not substitute probability, but integrates it with
an assessment of the reliability of its cognitive background.
Probability judgements make sense to the extent decision-makers want to stress
the similarity of the present situation to the past ones. On the contrary, the degree of
confidence expresses the suspicion that the present situation might entail innovative
elements. So probability evaluation can be said to express long term expectations,
whereas the degree of confidence stems from short term expectations. Thus, the model is
also interesting because short-term and long-term expectations influence each other in a
way that Keynes had appreciated (Kregel 1976). However, a large number of issues have
been expunged from Keynes' grand vision of expectations formation, conventions and
uncertainty.
Similar considerations could be made with respect to its relationship with
Schumpeter. Cognitive models like this can tell us a lot about the processes whereby
entrepreneurs arrive at the idea of combining production factors in novel ways, as
Schumpeter expressed himself. However, the model presented in this paper did not say32
how novel mental categories can be created but only when the need for novel mental
categories is felt.
Thus, the main shortcoming of this model with respect to the ideas expressed by
both Keynes and Schumpeter is that it does not even attempt to say how entrepreneurs
may change their mental models. What Shackle called “unpredictable hypotheses”
(Shackle 1961), are definitely out of its scope.
This is actually an issue that requires a modelisation of the structure of cognitive
interactions between economic agents. On the contrary, this model is still within the
boundaries of methodological individualism. A consequence of its acceptance is that
decision-makers may eventually doubt their mental models, but they never gather for a
brain storming with peers.
On the whole, the model presented in this article has a methodological, rather
than theoretical or empirical value. Although it gave just a hint of what is possible to do
by injecting cognitive sciences into economics, the author is firmly convinced that this is
an extremely promising avenue for future research.33
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